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Starting up a new journal is an excellent 
occasion to reﬂ  ect not only on the direc-
tions into which the targeted ﬁ  eld is cur-
rently heading but also on the remaining 
challenges to be met and the shortcomings 
to be overcome. We will do so by putting 
research on human cognition (the ﬁ  eld that 
we as the new specialty editors of Frontiers 
in Cognition represent) into a broader per-
spective and consider, among other things, 
the central role this research plays, or at least 
has the potential to play, in connecting other 
scientiﬁ  c areas and disciplines, as well as the 
social and infrastructural changes that will 
be necessary to successfully tackle the chal-
lenges that remain on our way to a truly 
integrative science of human cognition.
EXPLOITING NEUROSCIENCE
When one of us (Bernhard Hommel) ﬁ  rst 
met John Gabrieli in the early 1990s on a 
very interdisciplinary and (thus) very excit-
ing meeting in Berlin, he was still skeptical 
about the use of the back then increas-
ingly popular neuroimaging methods for 
the functional understanding of cognitive 
processes. “But however you think about it”, 
Gabrieli replied, “you got to admit that the 
cognitive neurosciences have made cognitive 
psychology so much more interesting”. And 
this is certainly true: neuroscientiﬁ  c obser-
vations have sparked numerous cognitive 
theories, approaches, and discoveries, just 
think of research on the binding problem 
and the notorious mirror neurons. Hence, 
the cognitive neurosciences have strongly 
affected cognitive psychology but they also 
keep challenging it and call for, so we argue, 
a reconsideration of how cognitive psychol-
ogists organize and carry out their research, 
both technically and socially.
The great success of the cognitive neuro-
sciences has already begun to shape the way 
psychologists ask their research questions, 
at least if they make use of modern neu-
roscientiﬁ  c techniques. Instead of asking 
the traditional question of how a particu-
lar cognitive mechanism works, increasing 
numbers of studies are targeting the “neural 
correlates” of these mechanisms or of the 
phenomenon under study. The outcome 
of such endeavors is pointers to particular 
brain areas, as if this would tell us anything 
about how the mechanism works or what 
algorithm it applies. It is certainly true that 
knowing about the brain areas involved 
can provide a ﬁ  rst step toward the investi-
gation of a mechanism, to be followed by 
the study of the interactions between such 
areas, and the mapping of these interactions 
to particular cognitive algorithms. But these 
following steps rarely take place and many 
psychologists are ready to accept the out-
come of the localization enterprise as an 
important observation in itself. Moreover, 
studies that are linking a particular brain 
area to a particular cognitive process com-
monly neglect the fact that the same area 
is also involved in numerous other, often 
unrelated types of processes, and attempts 
to explain why that is are extremely rare as 
well. Hence, the cognitive neurosciences do 
not only provide us with interesting new 
observations but their success and attrac-
tion for psychological students also tends 
to push psychological theorizing toward 
a reductionist perspective that “explains” 
  cognitive mechanisms by equating them 
with the brain structures that might be 
hosting them.
It will be crucial for the future of cogni-
tive psychology and the cognitive sciences 
in general how we deal with this challenge. 
One possibility is self-chosen splendid 
isolation and, indeed, numerous cogni-
tive psychologists are developing an often 
emotionally colored antipathetic attitude 
against the neurosciences and their meth-
ods. Unfortunately, this trend is facilitated 
by the fact that we are facing an increasing 
number of symposia and conferences to 
choose from at times of ﬁ  nancial crisis and 
tight travel budgets, so that many of us are 
to decide whether to go to more “behavio-
ral” or more “neuroscientiﬁ  c” meetings. As a 
consequence, meetings with a traditionally 
strong behavioral emphasis are losing sight 
of the cognitive neurosciences, while hard-
core neuroscientiﬁ  c meetings are no longer 
visited by many colleagues with a strong 
behavioral and theoretical background.
The other alternative takes much more 
effort, money, and possibly even changes in 
our social behavior. In principle, cognitive 
psychology has a lot to offer to the cognitive 
neurosciences and many discoveries in this 
area would not have been possible without 
the systematic development of tasks, para-
digms, and analytical methods of cognitive 
psychologists. However, the steadily grow-
ing neuroscientiﬁ  c machinery poses very 
high demands in terms of technical, meth-
odological, and analytical skills on the indi-
viduals using it, and only few, if any single 
researcher could ever master even the main 
techniques (say, EEG, fMRI, TMS, and PET) 
to a satisfying degree. Depending on back-
ground, abilities, age, money, and teaching 
load, some individuals may be successful 
working themselves into one of these tech-
niques or perhaps two, but even this indi-
vidual achievement would be insufﬁ  cient to 
reach what should be the ideal situation: to 
ﬂ  exibly pick the method that is suited best 
to address a particular research question.
Unfortunately, these enormous challenges 
tend to make the ﬁ  rst alternative much more 
attractive to quite a few. As a consequence, 
there is a real danger for a schism between 
theoretically guided, functionally oriented 
(but mainly behavioral) cognitive psychol-
ogy on the one hand and an increasingly 
atheoretical, data-driven cognitive neu-
roscience on the other. In our view, it will 
be crucial for the future success of cogni-
tive psychology to tackle this problem. No 
doubt, this will need aggressive efforts and, 
presumably, substantial changes in social 
networking and the infrastructural require-
ments for conducting and funding research. 
Given the increasing technical demands 
posed by research techniques (even if these 
will be alleviated by software development 
to some degree), ﬂ  exibly constructed social Hommel and Colzato  An integrated science of human cognition
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are aware of. Fulﬁ  lling his potential is likely 
to strongly increase the breadth and valid-
ity of our theories and models and provide 
interesting avenues for testing them.
INVESTIGATING PROCESSES, NOT 
PARADIGMS
Experimental paradigms are at the core of 
our trade. It is to a large extent paradigms 
that have made cognitive psychology so 
 successful – well-understood tasks that have 
been carefully  developed and systematically 
extended. This knowledge about paradigms 
and their theoretical implications is what 
neighboring areas and disciplines are after, 
what has been adopted from the clinical sci-
ences in the search for process-pure meas-
ures of particular cognitive impairments 
and by the social sciences to make abstract 
theoretical concepts empirically fruitful. 
Paradigms are also one of the main con-
tributions of cognitive psychology to the 
emerging cognitive sciences, and most of 
the important contributions to the func-
tional understanding of human cognition 
from neuroimaging research would have 
been impossible without the employment 
of well-developed cognitive paradigms.
And yet, cognitive psychology tends to 
overdo with respect to the enthusiasm for 
paradigms, which often stands in the way 
of theoretical progress in a wider sense. We 
devote whole research careers to one single 
experimental task or effect that often has 
very little if any ecological validity. There 
are obvious advantages of this strategy. 
Becoming truly proﬁ   cient in applying 
and making optimal use of a given para-
digm takes a lot of time and effort, which 
should not be wasted by jumping from one 
paradigm to another. Moreover, sticking 
to one paradigm or effect makes it much 
easier to develop a unique research pro-
ﬁ  le and acquire a solid scientiﬁ  c standing, 
and it is often tasks and effects that bring 
together researchers in special issues and 
lively scientiﬁ   c symposia. And yet, the 
resulting over-emphasis on paradigms 
and effects has a number of serious con-
sequences that we need to overcome on 
our way to a truly integrated approach to 
human cognition.
Paradigm-driven research necessarily 
aims at understanding whatever effects 
the paradigm produces. This has many 
disadvantages. For one, a given paradigm 
might be an excellent, close to process-pure 
the brain areas involved in moral decision-
making than in the development, justiﬁ  -
cation, and societal implementation of 
the moral guidelines on which these deci-
sions are being based. This has put the 
academic organization of the humanities 
under substantial economic pressure (as 
witnessed by the cancellation of many 
chairs and study programs in that area) 
and sometimes triggered discussions about 
their societal function and use. This is not 
the place for a discussion of that issue but 
we would like to emphasize an interest-
ing and, from the perspective of cognitive 
psychology, perhaps very fruitful side effect 
of this process.
Being under pressure, many disciplines 
in the humanities are opening up in terms 
of scope and approach to their topics. Given 
the noticeable success of the natural sci-
ences, it is not surprising that new ways are 
considered to bring humanities and natural 
sciences into closer contact and to create 
overlap wherever possible – some countries 
(e.g., Germany) have even launched dedi-
cated funding programs to achieve that. This 
provides unique opportunities for cognitive 
psychology, as it lies right at the interface 
between the humanities and the natural sci-
ences. Other disciplines and subdisciplines 
have made ample use of this particular 
position already, and freely borrowed cog-
nitive concepts, models, and paradigms to 
become more empirical, experimental, and 
in part biological. There are many examples, 
ranging from the development of the social 
cognition approach in social psychology 
(cf., Hommel, 2006a) over the search for 
the neural correlates of consciousness to 
neuroeconomics. Even though the resulting 
interdisciplinary endeavors are exciting and 
highly promising, cognitive psychologists 
could have played a more active and proac-
tive role in these and other developments, 
and could do so in the future. Many more 
bridges are needed indeed, just think of the 
cognitive implications of religion, literature, 
ethics, and more. It seems important to us 
that cognitive psychologists become more 
expansive with respect to the borders of 
their (sub)discipline and make more active 
use of the fact that they are interfacing with 
almost any area covered by the humanities. 
Their experimental expertise and often 
broad theoretical knowledge seems much 
more precious and have more potential for 
bridging other disciplines than many of us 
networks of researchers with very different 
backgrounds, expertise, and interests will be 
necessary – networks that will be tailored 
to the research question at hand and, thus, 
likely to change from one question to the 
other. To some degree, this is trivial to say 
and reﬂ  ects what successful research teams 
are practicing already. However, it is also true 
that the ways research is academically organ-
ized and funded, and individual research-
ers are evaluated, often do not ﬁ  t with the 
requirements of this research style (e.g., by 
favoring competition over cooperation). 
Moreover, exposing oneself to interdiscipli-
nary research environments and networks 
has very unfortunate psychological side 
effects: researchers who have worked very 
hard to reach a   particular level of expertise 
and self-conﬁ  dence are now thrown back to 
a beginner’s level in several respects. This is 
difﬁ  cult to bear without having been trained 
to overcome the resulting frustrations, and 
to acquire an interdisciplinary attitude and 
the necessary social skills from the start. This 
attitude and these skills can only be acquired 
in respective interdisciplinary environ-
ments, BA and MA programs, and research 
schools – which are still hard to ﬁ  nd.
Apart from these more administrative 
and political challenges, cognitive psy-
chologists need to assume a more asser-
tive, self-conﬁ   dent attitude with respect 
to the cognitive neurosciences. Here the 
challenge will be to exploit neuroscientiﬁ  c 
knowledge and techniques without giving 
up the very high theoretical standards that 
cognitive psychology has developed and 
that it can be proud of. This will no doubt 
be difﬁ  cult and require the acquisition of at 
least basic knowledge about neuroimaging 
and related techniques, but might become 
easier to manage though expansive social 
networking. In any case, however, it will 
be important that cognitive psychologists 
expand their methodological toolbox and 
raise their voice more distinctly in debates 
regarding the implications of neuroscien-
tiﬁ  c evidence for the functional understand-
ing of cognitive mechanisms and the brain 
processes underlying them.
BRIDGING HUMANITIES AND NATURAL 
SCIENCES
The recent decades have shifted the focus 
from the humanities to the natural sciences, 
so that, for just one of many examples, the 
general public is now more interested in Hommel and Colzato  An integrated science of human cognition
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CREATING SUITABLE RESEARCH 
CONTEXTS
Progress in science is often associated with 
competition, and competition is undeniably 
a particularly strong motivating factor. And 
yet, there are reasons to believe that over-
emphasizing this factor may seriously limit 
progress in science. Performing research is 
increasingly complex and complicated, 
especially if one is trying to go beyond sin-
gle effects and paradigms but to integrate 
multiple ideas and concepts. To deal with 
this complexity, we have argued, will often 
require teaming up with other colleagues, 
sometimes with different types of expertise 
and background, and even from different 
disciplines. To do so effectively presup-
poses solid social skills. Even though that 
might be trivial to say we don’t think it is. 
Many of us grew up in academic systems 
that comprised of surprisingly many, com-
monly male “specialists” with surprisingly 
few skills and motivation to communicate 
and to spark enthusiasm for their research 
topics in others. This attitude may have suf-
ﬁ  ced for a scientiﬁ  c career in the past, but 
we suspect that decidedly stronger emphasis 
on skills in communication and social net-
working will be necessary to advance our 
discipline in the future.
Fortunately, there are at least two fac-
tors our discipline has beneﬁ  ted from in this 
respect. First, the development and wide-
spread availability of software packages for 
the easy-to-access programming of psycho-
logical experiments has opened the door for 
increasing amounts of non-nerdy, socially 
proﬁ  cient cognitive students and increased 
the ratio of female to male students in cog-
nitive psychology. Second, the increasing 
amount of interaction between cognitive 
psychology and the cognitive neurosciences 
has attracted many students – many more 
students than traditional cognitive psychol-
ogy and students with much more diverse 
backgrounds in scientiﬁ  c perspective. This 
greater diversity is likely to make discus-
sions livelier and increase our tolerance 
and appreciation for seemingly weird out-
of-the-box ideas.
Fully exploiting this interdisciplinary 
attitude and the creative potential it pro-
vides requires strong efforts. For one, we 
need to counteract the centrifugal forces 
that are driving behavioral cognitive psy-
chology and the cognitive neurosciences 
apart. Among other things, this means that 
even the crucial criterion, it would certainly 
advance our discipline if empirical research, 
theoretical reasoning, and computational 
modeling would integrate better. And yet, 
it seems fair to say that computational mod-
els do not play a particularly dominant role 
in most areas of cognitive psychology. How 
can that be improved?
There are likely to be numerous answers, 
and many will have to do with the types of 
models, the ways they are tested, and how 
they are communicated, but there is one 
answer that we would like to emphasize. As 
developed in some more detail elsewhere 
(Hommel, 2006b), computational models 
are much more successful and inﬂ  uential if 
they come with new and unexpected empir-
ical data, that is, if model construction and 
model testing go hand in hand and if the 
data do not only serve to justify the model. 
Instead, models that merely redescribe old 
or replicated data from highly particular 
paradigms commonly fail to impress exper-
imental researchers sufﬁ  ciently to adopt and 
work with them.
However, being a good modeler and a 
good, broadly experienced experimental-
ist at the same time is quite a challenge 
that most of us are not up to, a problem 
that is similar to our cognitive and time 
restrictions with regard to the acquisition 
of neuroscientiﬁ  c methods, as discussed 
above. This is why we consider it essential 
for computational modelers to team up 
with experimentalists, probably even from 
diverse areas, to get the intended cycle 
from modeling to testing to model modi-
ﬁ  cation to testing etc. really going and for 
making it really interesting. What is also 
likely to help is to provide interested col-
leagues with the software tools necessary 
to generate model predictions and to test 
the model, as in the ACT-R community 
(act-r.psy.cmu.edu). Only then, we think, 
would it be possible to achieve what most 
models promise but actually fail to achieve: 
the generation of really new and relevant, 
but unexpected and counterintuitive pre-
dictions that can be demonstrated to stand 
empirical test, ideally across different tasks 
and paradigms. Only if that level could be 
reached at a broader scale, computational 
models would impact our theorizing to a 
degree that goes beyond mere existence 
proofs or the demonstration of computa-
tional principles (which of course will also 
remain important).
  measure of one cognitive process or 
  mechanism but it is likely to be a lousy 
measure of numerous other processes or 
mechanisms. If so, why would one even 
try to understand the role of the latter 
in this particular task rather than using 
another, better-suited task to assess those 
other processes? And yet, given our ﬁ  xa-
tion on tasks and effects, many models we 
develop are trying to capture all the proc-
esses involved therein and, indeed, we as 
reviewers and editors would insist that 
authors include all these processes in their 
model. Would it not be  better to follow the 
exact opposite strategy? That is, to try to 
capture one given process across as many 
paradigms and effects as possible, thereby 
explicitly ignoring the fact that these 
paradigms and effects are not equivalent 
with respect to a number of other proc-
esses. And to try to evaluate our favorite 
paradigms and effects much more in terms 
of how well they capture one given proc-
ess. Of course, this strategy would by no 
means be foolproof and likely to generate 
a new kind of “specialist” that is narrow-
minded not in terms of tasks but in terms 
of processes. And yet, it seems essential to 
us that we at least try to reduce our present 
ﬁ  xation on paradigms and effects. One of 
several beneﬁ  ts of such a strategy is that 
we could be much more certain that our 
research topic has external validity. Indeed, 
it is much easier to explain how important 
it is to investigate, say, the human will or 
decision-making under uncertainty than 
to try relating the task-switching paradigm 
or the Stroop effect to the real world.
The lesson to be learned, we think, is 
to reconsider our paradigms and effects 
as what they are: means to an end but not 
ends by themselves. The true goal of an inte-
grated cognitive science is the understand-
ing and modeling of cognitive mechanisms 
(measured as purely as possible) and the 
understanding of psychological phenom-
ena, that ideally are either taken from, or 
are at least modeled after behavior that can 
be found outside of our labs.
INTEGRATING MODELING AND 
EXPERIMENTATION
A discipline’s level of maturity is often meas-
ured by the degree to which the phenomena 
it addresses can be captured by mathemati-
cal models. Even though one can argue 
whether this is a particularly important or Hommel and Colzato  An integrated science of human cognition
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•  Paradigmatic frontiers, by tracing inte-
resting cognitive mechanisms across 
various experimental paradigms and 
by making models focusing on these 
mechanisms but not on the paradigms 
assessing them.
•  Disciplinary frontiers, by getting in clo-
ser touch to neighboring psychological 
subdisciplines and other disciplines, so 
to make productive use of our unique 
position as an interface between the 
humanities and the natural sciences.
•  Personal frontiers, by engaging more in 
social networking and creating ﬂ  exible, 
quickly changing research groups that 
cover a broad range of expertise and 
theoretical background.
Sure enough, tackling these challenges 
requires activities that go way beyond 
the mission of a scientiﬁ  c journal, even if 
Frontiers’ interactive editorial style does 
provide new opportunities in this context. 
Nevertheless, we will do what we can in 
order to facilitate these processes, be it in 
the form of the editorial policy, which will 
emphasize innovation and courage, inter-
disciplinarity and theoretical breadth, or in 
the form of special issues that, in terms of 
topic or style, will help to turn our science 
from  Newell’s (1973) game of 20 ques-
tions with nature that we can’t win into a 
cumulative science that provides us with an 
increasingly comprehensive understanding 
of human cognition and action.
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we need to succeed in keeping or creating 
interesting scientiﬁ  c conferences or other 
types of meetings that are attractive for and 
thus visited by both behavioral and neu-
roscientiﬁ  c researchers. It also means that 
more interdisciplinary study programs and 
graduate schools will need to be launched, 
including programs that integrate psycho-
logical subdisciplines. But we also need to 
reconsider the reward systems handled by 
universities and funding agencies to see 
whether more could be done to facilitate 
collaboration and ﬂ  exible networking.
GAMES WITHOUT FRONTIERS
To conclude, the recent developments in and 
around our ﬁ  eld have the potential to bring 
us much closer to a well-integrated science 
of human cognition. Fulﬁ  lling this potential, 
so we have argued, will be much easier if we 
are strongly expanding or even doing away 
with at least four types of frontiers:
•  Methodological frontiers, by including 
neuroscientiﬁ  c techniques and machi-
nery in our experimental toolbox – not 
to trade our functional theories for 
neuroanatomical or neurophysiologi-
cal hypotheses but to have more instru-
ments at our disposal to test them.